CyberArk Credential Providers can be configured to retain passwords, password metadata, and other application properties in a local, encrypted cache file. Under certain conditions, the effective key space used to encrypt the cache is significantly reduced. For an attacker who understands the key derivation scheme and encryption mechanics, full access to the information used to derive the encryption key is sufficient to reduce effective key space to one. Even in cases where the information is not known, the encrypted cache files will likely be unable to withstand a brute force attack. However, the severity of this issue is partially mitigated by the privilege level required (root) for access. Versions prior to 12.1 are affected.
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CyberArk's Credential Provider loopback communications on TCP port 18923 are encrypted with key material that has extremely low entropy. In all currently-known use cases, the effective key space is less than 2^16. For an attacker who understands the key derivation scheme and encryption mechanics, knowledge of the source port and access to the payloads of a given client-server exchange are sufficient to reduce effective key space to one. In cases where the source port is not known, the encrypted payloads will be unable to withstand a brute force attack. Additionally, the user identification mechanism used by CyberArk's Credential Provider is vulnerable to a race condition where an unauthorized/unprivileged user can submit one or more encrypted query requests. If the race is won, the attacker will be able to retrieve sensitive information including passwords and password metadata. Versions prior to 12.1 are affected.
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CyberArk Credential Providers and possibly other Vault components use credential files to store usernames and encrypted passwords. Under certain conditions, the effective key space used to encrypt the passwords is significantly reduced. For an attacker who understands the key derivation scheme and encryption mechanics, full access to the information used to derive the encryption key is sufficient to reduce effective key space to one. With partial access, the effective key space can vary depending on the information available, and a number of those variations are unlikely to withstand brute force attacks. Versions prior to 12.1 are affected.
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FTimes is a system baselining and evidence collection tool. Its primary purpose is to gather and/or develop topographical information and attributes about specified directories and files in a manner conducive to intrusion and forensic analysis. It was designed to support the following initiatives: content integrity monitoring, incident response, intrusion analysis, and computer forensics.
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FTimes is a system baselining and evidence collection tool. Its primary purpose is to gather and/or develop topographical information and attributes about specified directories and files in a manner conducive to intrusion and forensic analysis. It was designed to support the following initiatives: content integrity monitoring, incident response, intrusion analysis, and computer forensics.
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FTimes is a system baselining and evidence collection tool. Its primary purpose is to gather and/or develop topographical information and attributes about specified directories and files in a manner conducive to intrusion and forensic analysis. It was designed to support the following initiatives: content integrity monitoring, incident response, intrusion analysis, and computer forensics.
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