This Metasploit module exploits CVE-2022-30525, an unauthenticated remote command injection vulnerability affecting Zyxel firewalls with zero touch provisioning (ZTP) support. By sending a malicious setWanPortSt command containing an mtu field with a crafted OS command to the /ztp/cgi-bin/handler page, an attacker can gain remote command execution as the nobody user. Affected Zyxel models are USG FLEX 50, 50W, 100W, 200, 500, 700 using firmware 5.21 and below, USG20-VPN and USG20W-VPN using firmware 5.21 and below, and ATP 100, 200, 500, 700, 800 using firmware 5.21 and below.
ab9073cd14f8ea730621aa93b69a0d03cb5f9d8e92dbc88068fca19ff77f6fabUbuntu Security Notice 5421-1 - It was discovered that LibTIFF incorrectly handled certain images. An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a crash, resulting in a denial of service. This issue only affects Ubuntu 14.04 ESM, Ubuntu 16.04 ESM, Ubuntu 18.04 LTS and Ubuntu 20.04 LTS. Chintan Shah discovered that LibTIFF incorrectly handled memory when handling certain images. An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a crash, resulting in a denial of service, or possibly execute arbitrary code.
fd53c220dff57e76bdac23217ea634b1fb5272778561ded300fb599bd6d0ff03Red Hat Security Advisory 2022-2253-01 - The pcs packages provide a command-line configuration system for the Pacemaker and Corosync utilities. Issues addressed include a traversal vulnerability.
9a32abd8b74de6f227a9c81959dd626384a6d2e0c13b263b8249086537088649A use-after-free issue exists in Chrome 100 and earlier versions. A malicious extension can achieve arbitrary code execution in the browser process.
595428413ed6af41648e85f12bfacfc4d3b4b659dea62dab16b66777c9ddb014IpMatcher versions 1.0.4.1 and below for .NET Core 2.0 and .NET Framework 4.5.2 incorrectly validates octal and hexadecimal input data which can lead to indeterminate server-side request forgery, local file inclusion, remote file inclusion, and denial of service vectors.
98c5f3ee4fded068839fc2a03bbd74be24dce6bd2b2774a8a477b3d476489bb1Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
416d676d2dba2bc714a0f32899777fc4ac6ccc2dee1d321fbce06785689158e1Victorian Machinery is a proof of concept exploit for CVE-2022-30525. The vulnerability is an unauthenticated and remote command injection vulnerability affecting Zyxel firewall's that support zero touch provisioning. Zyxel pushed a fix for this issue on April 28, 2022. Multiple models are affected.
d85780bb5daa2abd4c685fc1f2bd14ad0bfe7fbd9a5a6a99b45f1efcddb6a0bfRed Hat Security Advisory 2022-2256-01 - The pcs packages provide a command-line configuration system for the Pacemaker and Corosync utilities. Issues addressed include a traversal vulnerability.
d5cbde1ab6dba9a7e8dd48d44d6cd22c6eca211b66d54efec3cfba72adb1e1d8Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
f795b475d29adfdf8b620a90005e0f383bdd74c416a7b0a03d67e03d43a0cbc0WordPress WP Event Manager plugin version 3.1.27 suffers from a persistent cross site scripting vulnerability.
cb5312a73f5b91f714b3b64a7d4a985e9b27b678feeae51e27a65c49cef79597Red Hat Security Advisory 2022-2255-01 - The pcs packages provide a command-line configuration system for the Pacemaker and Corosync utilities. Issues addressed include a traversal vulnerability.
653bf2d16cb84180d0c91773f8918c2ef8af28f562c664264e8dacc64c078df8Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
4d905cb2862459d4fecc48e165734150e7824debee83563d1c97370c68c37f49HighCMS/HighPortal version 12.x appears to suffer from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.
11e531f865e4da1f04161aa0a4cb5e11bbe807e029d3818481e6c9fa1d18a1e6Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
0ce9d83fdb3abb054ddf70fa9d218732ae0b6e0c7a630b1391d656e794fc6b19Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
9ba5c2eaaec9a657238330273ff40e343857a13f4d7407516463e0e13b810726Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
5f702738bda0d77ea713340e950f9f2bd08db678fa6f2ebafafefa803ec45bc0
© 2024 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.
%7Cutmcsr%3D(direct)%7Cutmcmd%3D(none)){kind=small}
Follow us on Twitter
Follow us on Facebook
Subscribe to an RSS Feed